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EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
W Hamilton Bryson 
E Q.UITY is the system of justice that arose in the court of the lord chancellor of England in 
the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. (In 
order to avoid confusion, this essay will not use 
the word equity to refer to the nontechnical con-
cepts of fairness and justice.) Equitable remedies 
are those remedies granted by courts of equity as 
opposed to legal remedies, which are granted by 
courts of common law. The system of remedies 
we call equity arose to supplement and to com-
plement, but not to supplant, the common law of 
England. 
ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS TO 
MODERN EQUITY PRACTICE 
The common law of England in the Middle 
Ages, whether administered in the royal courts 
or the county courts, was an unwritten system of 
law that was thought to be totally comprehen-
sive; it governed all situations, and it was the 
duty of the courts to "discover" the law and to 
apply it to each particular case. In the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, common-law remedies 
grew to combat all types of injuries; in some 
cases the royal courts were granting remedies to 
deal with problems formerly handled only in the 
county courts and, in other cases, to deal with 
newly invented injuries. This was a period of 
luxuriant growth for the English common law. 
However, the fourteenth century saw the rise of 
Parliament as a legislative body and, by midcen-
tury, the development of a substantial body of 
judicial precedent stating the common law. The 
result was that common-law judges were becom-
ing trapped by their own precedents and in time 
became unable to change the law without tre-
spassing upon the legislative prerogative of Par-
liament. Judicial restraint is a good thing, but it 
can be carried too far, for there is no such thing 
as a general rule (or a statute) that cannot be 
avoided or perverted by persons of bad inten-
tions. Furthermore, the medieval Parliament was 
not a very efficient legislature by modem stan-
dards; for one thing it met only irregularly, usu-
ally being called when the king needed more 
money. 
As the common-law courts became unable to 
grant new types of remedies to deal with new 
types of problems, litigants turned to the king, 
and the king sent them to the lord chancellor, the 
head of the royal secretariat, for special aid. As 
these special petitions were regularly accepted 
and decided, the chancery developed into !: law 
court, and the system of justice administered 
there became known as equity. Equity thus arose 
several centuries later than the common law and 
was that much more modern in terms of proce-
dure and substantive law. It is to be remembered 
that chancery is a court that applies the system of 
law called equity. A chancellor is an official who 
is the keeper of someone's seal; the lord chancel-
lor of Great Britain is only incidentally a judge. 
Thus, an equity judge is not usually a chancellor, 
though in the United States the term chancellqr is 
sometimes used to refer ·to an equity judge ~nd 
the term chancery is used loosely to refer to an 
equity court and equity jurisdiction. '"fhis article 
will use the word chancery to refer only to the 
court of the lord chancellor and not to any other 
court of equity. 
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Equity arose in the court of chancery in order 
to provide remedies when the common law 
proved inadequate to do justice in a particular 
case. (From the middle of the sixteenth century 
onward, the court of exchequer also granted eq-
uitable remedies.) Some of the substantive im-
... 
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provements of equity were the enforcement of 
trusts and the use of various defenses to con-
tracts. A trust, or a use, was a type of contract, 
usually in reference to land, which was invented 
after the common-law writs (which controlled 
the jurisdiction and procedures of the common-
law courts) had become fixed and unchangeable. 
A trust is the situation in which the common-law 
ownership of property is given to a person (the 
trustee) to hold and manage for the benefit of 
another person (the beneficiary of the trust). 
Since there was no common-law writ available to 
enfo1rce a trust and since the chancery clerks and 
the common-law judges could not change the 
law by inventing a new one without unconstitu-
tionally usurping the legislative power of Parlia-
ment, the chancellor enforced them. It was clear 
to the entire legal profession that justice re-
quired the enforcement of trusts and uses. Since 
the common-law courts could (or would) not, 
everyone agreed that equity should. Thus, the 
beneficiary of the trust is said to be the equitable 
owner of the property in question. The trust, 
which is completely unknown in European law, is 
a maknificent device for managing property or 
companies in both personal and commercial set-
tings. This device has been steadily refined over 
the centuries to serve more and more needs of 
society. 
In the area of contracts, justice required that 
each party receive "consideration"-that is, 
something of value for the performance of his 
part of the agreement. The common-law courts 
required proof of consideration "flowing" from 
the plaintiff to the defendant (the obligor) before 
a plaintiff (the obligee) could recover on an oral 
contract. However, if the contract was in writing 
and under the defendant's seal, the written and 
sealed instrument was sufficient proof for a com-
mon-law recovery, even though there was no 
consideration. A sharp dealer would be able to 
take advantage of others by always having such 
an unfair bargain reduced to writing with an eye 
to future litigation, relying on well-established 
common-law precedent. The common-law 
courts could not change their law, but the court 
of equity came to require the unconscionable 
obligee to forgo his unfair gain. The courts of 
equity required that all contracts be supported 
by consideration on both sides. 
The mortgage is a common-law conveyance of 
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land to secure a loan; the mortgage contract is 
written so that if the loan is repaid, the debtor 
gets his land back; if it is not repaid in full, the 
creditor keeps the land, even if only one payment 
is not made or if payment is made only one day 
late. In many cases a debtor may be in technical 
default only, but the common-law courts must 
enforce the contract that was freely entered into 
by the debtor. To prevent such harsh results, 
penalties, and forfeitures, the courts of equity 
allow the debtor to redeem his land by making 
the payments late (with appropriate additional 
interest); thus, the equity courts have created 
what is called an equity ofredemption. (To pro-
tect fair-minded creditors, the courts of equity 
allow a creditor to come into the equity court and 
prove the hopeless insolvency of his debtor, and 
the equity judge will foreclose the debtor's eq-
uity of redemption; this will give the creditor 
clear title to the land being held as security so 
that he can sell it and recoup the amount of the 
defaulted loan.) Although the general common-
law rule that contracts should be kept is well 
respected by society, ever'yone's sense of justice 
will acknowledge that the equity of redemption 
is a fine tuning by the courts of equity that results 
in substantial justice in the individual case where 
the debtor is acting in good faith but has had a 
bit of bad luck. 
In more recent times the courts of equity have 
evolved a law of fiduciary responsibility, which 
did not exist in medieval England. Thus, ad-
ministrators of estates, guardians of mental in-
competents, and trustees are held to higher stan-
dards of loyalty than are ordinary businessmen. 
The equity jurisdiction of the chancellor's 
court grew in the fifteenth century also to cure 
problems in the administration of justice caused 
by various defects in the procedures of the old 
common-law courts. One common-law rule of 
evidence was that a party could not testify in 
court as a witness. Much has been written about 
the aspect of this rule that a person cannot testify 
against himself, but we will consider here that a 
person also could not testify for himself. Thus, 
where the only witnesses to a transaction or oc-
currence were the parties thereto, the person 
injured could not prove his case in a court of 
common law, because there was no admissible 
evidence; and since the plaintiff always has the 
burden of persuasion, the defendant would win 
J 
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by default. Thus, if one were assaulted in a dark 
alley, one had no practical remedy at common 
law. To aid the injured party, the courts of eq-
uity, where the defendant was required to plead 
under oath, would allow a person with a com-
mon-law grievance to sue in equity in order to 
force the defendant to respond under oath and 
"discover" (make known) the truth, and then this 
sworn statement would constitute a binding ad-
mission for use in the common-law court. In 
time, the courts of equity, where discovery was 
needed, began to retain the case and to decide 
the common-law dispute in order to avoid the 
multiplicity of litigation that would have been, 
involved by sending the plaintiff back to the 
court of law. This was the origin of the bill of 
discovery. 
One of the most glaring archaic features of the 
medieval common law was trial by jury. Although 
the criminal jury was usually up to its task, life 
was too complicated for the civil jury; civil juries 
were seldom sufficiently educated or ex-
perienced to understand complex issues of 
financial importance. But regardless of how 
good the jurors might have been, the jury system 
required a single verdict of liability or not and, 
if so, what damages. Thus, where there were 
multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the common-
law jury was inadequate to sort out issues of, for 
example, which of the defendants might be liable 
for what proportion of the damages. In the 
courts of equity, which arose long after the com-
mon-law courts had settled upon the use of the 
jury as the trier of the facts of the case, the judge 
heard all of the issues of the case and, being an 
educated and highly competent person, was able 
to determine complicated issues. 
Another jury-related problem was the com-
mon-law action of account. When the parties 
presented an accounting dispute to the court, 
the jury was required to render a separate verdict 
on each line in the account; this clumsy proce-
dure was beyond the abilities of a jury of plough-
men, and the courts of equity took over account-
ing litigation to remedy this deficiency in the 
common law. 
If two different persons claimed an object or 
a fund in the hands of a third party, problems 
could arise in the common-law courts. For exam-
ple, if an expensive diamond necklace had been 
given to a jeweler to be repaired, the owner had 
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died, and the jeweler had then been sued at com-
mon law for the necklace by both the heir and the 
widow, there would have been a very real danger 
that the different juries in the two common-law 
cases would both find against the jeweler. To 
prevent the likelihood of inconsistent jury ver-
dicts and double liability, the courts of equity 
would allow the defendant jeweler to come into 
equity and to bring both common-law plaintiffs 
into the case, thus forcing them to litigate in 
equity their competing common-law claims. 
A more serious defect of the common-law 
procedure was that when any party died, the law-
suit died, and the plaintiff had to restart his suit 
from scratch. Where there were many parties, it 
was frequently the case, particularly where a 
whole family was involved, as in litigation over a 
family inheritance, that parties would die and 
new parties be born, so that the case could never 
be brought to a conclusion. This problem was 
remedied by the courts of equity, because there 
a case could be easily revived when there was a 
change in parties and the litigation would not be 
frustrated by such accidents. 
The fifteenth century in England was a period 
of political weakness as a result of the drawn-out 
Wars of the Roses; even during periods of peace, 
the authority of the crown was weak. England 
was at the mercy of private armies; the county 
administrators, the sheriffs, were usually either 
powerless or beyond the control of the courts. It 
was a period during which the rich and the pow-
erful of the county could manipulate or intimi-
date juries and thus pervert the course of justice. 
Frequently weak and poor litigants had to resort 
to the court of the lord chancellor, the most pow-
erful political figure in the country, to obtain 
justice against their strong neighb9rs. The chan-
cellor was the king's prime minister in fact, 
though not in name, and he could do justife and 
enforce his orders without fear or favor .··l Many 
common-law disputes were therefore heard in 
the court of chancery in the fifteenth century. 
Thus did equity come into existence to sup-
plement and complement the common law. Eq-
uity does not comPete with the common law but 
tunes it more finely. The common law is, in the-
ory, a complete system; equity is not a system 
within itself but rather relates to the common law 
and aids the common law.Justice came to consist 
of both common law and equity; English justice 
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would be defective without both. This was recog-
nized as early as the fifteenth century, and so 
lawyers and judges had to work out in the plead-
ing stage of the litigation whether justice in a 
particular case was to be served in a court of 
common law or a court of equity. 
Equity does not deny the validity of the com-
mon law but rather recognizes it and fulfills it. 
Equity does not change the common law, but 
where a person is using the common law to an 
unjust purpose, the equity judge will order that 
person not to sue in the common-law court or 
not toJ'enforce a common-law judgment. The 
court of equity does not change the common law 
or reverse, overrule, or annul any common-law 
judgment, for to do so would be an unconstitu-
tional usurpation of legislative power and an il-
legal appellate power over the common-law 
courts. But all disinterested persons would agree 
that the common-law courts should not be used 
in an unjust manner, and .thus, the equity court 
orders that person not to do it. It is against good 
conscience to do injustice. Equity courts simply 
fOrce defendants to act according to conscience; 
conseqyently, they have frequently been called 
courts of conscience. 
St. German was the first scholar to attempt to 
explain the activities and jurisdiction of the chan-
cellor's court. He spoke in terms of epikeia and 
conscience. The former concept is that, although 
all law must be framed in general terms, it should 
be applied to individual cases with flexibility and 
mitigation. 'fhe concept of conscience is the 
same today as it was in the sixteenth century, a 
sense of absolute right versus wrong. A party 
should not be allowed to use the common law to 
perpetrate a wrong. For example, if a person 
made a written contract under seal, an agree-
ment to pay money for an assignment of contract 
rights, and then it turned out that the assignment 
was invalid and worthless, the general common-
law rules allowed the enforcement of the written 
contract. However, the injustice of enforcing this 
contract was obvious, because while contracts 
should be kept as a general rule, where one party 
did not get what he thought he was getting, he 
should not have to give up what he promised to 
pay. The remedy for the mistaken person is to 
sue in equity for an order to the other party not 
to sue on the contract and to return the written 
agreement to him or, if he had already been 
sued, not to ask the sheriff to execute the com-
548 
n1on-law judgment. Thus, the contract and the 
common-law judgment remain in force, but if 
they are taken advantage of, the obligee will be 
put in prison for contempt of the equity court's 
order. 
Since the courts of equity grant remedies only 
when the ordinary common-law remedies are 
inadequate, the jurisdiction of the equity courts 
is said to be extraordinary. The term extraordinary 
is used here in the sense of going beyond the 
basic rather than in the sense of unusual; equity 
is both extraordinary and quite usual and fre-
quent. 
One aspect of extraordinary equity powers in-
volves the personal order. A personal order does 
not change the law or the parties' strict common-
law rights and is enforced by the court's holding 
the defendant in contempt and keeping him in 
prison until he obeys. Thus, equity is said to act 
in personam. A common-law court acts in rem 
(that is, on the property of the defendant), de-
claring the money or land in dispute to belong to 
the successful plaintiff. The common-law court 
thus changes ownership and orders the sheriff to 
take the money or land from the defendant and 
to give it to the plaintiff. It should be noted, 
however, that in modern pi:actice, statutes have 
given the courts of equity power to act in rem so 
that, for example, a sheriff can execute an equity 
order or a commissioner can be appointed to 
make a common-law conveyance or release in the 
defendant's name. 
The procedure of the equity courts, some-
times referred to as English bill procedure, 
which was developed in the fifteenth-century 
chancery, was clearly more modern and much 
more efficient than the common-law procedure, 
with its forms of action and trial by jury. Every 
court that was set up by act of Parliament or 
evolved on its own in England from the fifteenth 
century onward used this English bill procedure 
rather than the procedure of the common-law 
courts. 
It has been argued that the origin of equity 
procedure and substantive law is to be found in 
the procedure of the canon-law courts. Most of 
the medieval English chancellors were bishops in 
whose courts the canon law was used. It is my 
opinion that equity was an evolution native to 
England and that the bill grew out of an ordinary 
petition or request, that depositions grew out of 
administrative inquisitions, and so on. The fact 
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that the chancellors were bishops does not mean 
that they could not keep their courts entirely 
separate. Indeed, many common-law judges 
were bishops. Furthermore, many leading 
medieval politicians were given bishoprics so 
that the king could have administrators without 
having to pay them salaries; the bishops could do 
the king's work in person and their ecclesiastical 
work by deputy. Most ecclesiastical courts were 
presided over by the bishop's official or deputy 
anyway. There are similarities and dissimilarities 
between the canon law and equity. 
The peaceful coexistence of law and equity 
continued until the chancellorship of Cardinal 
Wolsey during the early reign of Henry VIII. 
Thomas Wolsey, a person of modest social back-
ground, came to the notice of Henry VIII, who 
recognized in him a competent administrator 
and so put him into the highest seats of power in 
the kingdom, civic and ecclesiastical. As lord 
chancellor, archbishop of York, cardinal, and 
papal legate, he was exalted over all men in En-
gland except only the king himself and the pope. 
The power went to Wolsey's head, and he alien-
ated people. The odium that became attached to 
Wolsey personally spilled over onto his court of 
chancery and from there to the rules of equity 
that were administered in chancery courts. 
In 1529, Cardinal Wolsey, having failed to get 
Henry VIII's divorce from Queen Catherine, was 
stripped of all his offices and wealth. He died 
shortly thereafter of a broken heart, having lost 
his power, his only love. He was succeeded in the 
office of lord chancellor by the common lawyer 
Sir Thomas More. This was an interesting suc-
cession in that More was the first layman to be 
appointed chancellor since 1454; he had not 
been, and was not to become, the king's prime 
political adviser; and he was a well-known prac-
ticing lawyer. It was believed that he would re-
store the proper relationship between common 
law and equity. Soon after his appointment, he 
called the judges together to settle this relation-
ship. He proposed not to enjoin common-law 
litigation if the judges would reform the com-
mon law, but the judges said that they did not 
have the power to change the law, and this forced 
More to continue to grant injunctions, in perso-
nam orders, as Wolsey and all earlier chancellors 
had done. Thus, More's appointment did not 
change or restore anything; but because he was 
a courteous man, the antagonisms between com-
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mon law and equity were quickly forgotten, and 
equanimity prevailed until the reign of James I. 
In the first decade of the seventeenth century, 
two very ambitious and aggressive men began to 
compete over personal dominance of the English 
legal system. The two were Thomas Egerton, 
Lord Ellesmere, who became lord chancellor, 
and Sir Edward Coke (pronounced "Cook"), a 
common-law judge who became lord chief jus-
tice of England. The chancellor has always been 
the administrative head on the English judiciary, 
but tradition was for Coke a servant, not a mas-
ter. When Coke became lord chief justice of En-
gland, he began a systematic attack on every 
court and legal system but his own. 
In the early seventeenth century, the concept 
of res judicata-the doctrine that once a court 
has decided a matter, it cannot be litigated again 
-had not been worked out between the courts 
of law and courts of equity. Therefore, if a per-
son was sued at common law on a contract to 
which he had a defense in equity, he could sue in 
equity at once to stop the plaintiff (the obligee) 
from suing at common law, or he could wait and, 
if the common-law result was against him, sue to 
prevent the enforcement of the judgment. Thus, 
the defendant (the obligor) had two chances of 
success. Today, the defendant at common law 
must resort to equity at once or lose his equitable 
defense. 
This situation was galling to Coke because the 
equity order, the injunction, appeared to be an 
appeal to his rival, the lord chancellor. Coke 
therefore let it be known that he was prepared to 
stop this practice. Soon a most unworthy plain-
tiff, Richard Glanvill, appeared in Coke's court to 
sue on a contract that was the result of his gross 
fraud and deceit. (He had sold a topaz, repre-
senting it to be a diamond.) He got judgment; 
the court of chancery issued an injunction to stop 
enforcement of the common-law judgemel)t; the 
injunction was disobeyed; Egerton put Glanvill 
in prison for contempt of court; and Coke or-
dered him released on a writ of habeas corpus. 
This matter ended inconclusively, but this case 
and several others made a public issue of this 
problem of the practice of law and the adminis-
tration of justice. The whole matter of the 
boundaries between common law and equity 
were then referred to the king's counsel for full 
debate and resolution. The result was in favor of 
the courts of equity, as should have been ex-
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pected. Even though equity practice was not per-
fect, it was more modern and more flexible than 
the common law. The old rule was thus reestab-
lished in 1616 without any further serious dis-
pute. Simply stated, the rule was that where the 
results of an equity order and a common-law 
order were in disagreement, the equity rule and 
decree would prevail. Otherwise, equity would 
have been unable to perform its function of see-
ing justice done in the individual case. Shortly 
thereafter, Coke was removed from his judge-
ship and Egerton died, and things returned to 
nri1rmal in the English courts. A generation later, 
personalities and politics, rather than jurispru-
dence, again impinged on the relationship be-
tween common law and equity. Soon after his 
accession to the throne in 1625, Charles I de-
cided to follow the French theories and methods 
of government and to rule England without the 
interference of Parliament. When Parliament 
was removed as a political forum, the opponents 
of the king's policies took their fights to the area 
of the law courts. Lord Coventry, the lord chan-
cellor, was identified with the king and his poli-
cie~. And again the dislike of the chancellor re-
sulted in dislike of his court and of its 
jurisprudence. 
It was during this period that John Selden, the 
famous legal scholar and antiroyalist, published 
his famous jibe at equity: "Equity is a roguish 
thing; for [in] law we have a measure [we can] 
know what to trust to. Equity is according to the 
conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that 
is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as 
if they should make the standard for the measure 
we call a foot to be the chancellor's foot; what an 
uncertain measure this Would be." 
The political, military, and personal defeats of 
Charles I are well known. As the king, the bish-
ops, and the aristocracy were one by one 
removed from power, the radicals turned against 
Oliver Cromwell and the moderate Puritans, and 
in their zeal and ignorance they attacked the law 
itself. One of their proposals was to abolish the 
court of chancery. This attack was the low point 
of equity. This ill-conceived move was referred 
to a commission set up under Sir Matthew Hale 
to study the issue of law reform in general, and 
nothing more was heard of the taking-away of 
the chancery. During the interregnum, the court 
of chancery was presided over by a committee of 
three commissioners, and this assured that it 
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would have no political power. The normal 
course of equity jurisprudence in the courts of 
chancery and exchequer continued unabated 
during the time of Cromwell. 
After the Restoration, the commercial empire 
of England began to grow by leaps and bounds. 
As English wealth became more and more based 
on commerce, the patronage of the lord trea-
surer became greater than that of the lord chan-
cellor, and so the politician closest to the king 
sought to be appointed the former rather than 
the latter. The result was that the chancellor be-
came less important politically than he had been 
in the past and thus had more time for the per-
formance of his judicial duties. Furthermore, the 
legal ability of the candidate for the position of 
lord chancellor became more important than his 
political connections. Thus, the period extend-
ing from the Restoration into the middle of the 
nineteenth century produced a series of schol-
arly and legally adept chancellors whose opin-
ions were systematically reported. 
First and foremost was Heneage Finch, earl of 
Nottingham, a lawyer arid a judge without equal. 
Since the Middle Ages, the court of chancery had 
been loosely called a court of conscience. Lord 
Nottingham put the the~ry of conscience into its 
proper perspective when, in Cook v. Fountain 
(1676), he stated that he was not ruling accord-
ing to the personal conscience of any particular 
party litigant, himself, or the king but according 
to the civic conscience of the English legal sys-
tem. The concept of conscience as administered 
in the courts of equity is general and institu-
tional; it is to be found in the established prac-
tices and precedents of the courts of equity; it 
applies equally to all persons. Since Nottingham 
expounded equity doctrine in lucid and rational 
opinions based on precedent and since his opin-
ions were the first to be systematically published, 
he has been called "the father of equity." 
Equity jurisprudence was developed through-
out the eighteenth century by a series of most 
excellent jurists: Charles Talbot, Lord Talbot; 
Philip Yorke, Lord Hardwicke; Charles Pratt, 
Lord Camden; and Edward Thurlow, Lord 
Thurlow, among others. The lord chancellor 
during the long and difficult later years of 
George III was John Scott, earl of Eldon. We 
must pause to consider Lord Eldon as lord chan-
cellor. 
Lord Eldon, who was as politically and per-
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sonally traditional as the king, was a brilliant eq-
uity judge, but there were problems. Eldon was 
pilloried by the novelist Charles Dickens in Bleak 
House as being the perpetrator of endless judicial 
delay, and the bar agreed with Dickens; Eldon 
blamed the truly excessive delays in his court on 
the bar and on the litigants themselves. (The 
true villain in Bleak House was a testator who 
made a series of wills without destroying the ear-
lier ones.) However, frequently Eldon would 
hear the evidence in a case, take it under advise-
ment, and then two years later, when he was 
ready to render an opinion, have to have the case 
reargued. (If these delays were really so irksome 
to the legal profession, they could have divide\! 
their equity practice between the chancery and 
the exchequer, but they for some reason pre-
ferred the delays of the chancery to quick results 
in the exchequer.) 
Lord Eldon's opinions were carefully rea-
soned and drafted; many are still cited today. 
Eldon was judicially conservative, and he felt 
bound to follow the traditional practices and the 
established law. Thus, when justice required him 
to grant a mandatory injunction in the case of 
Lane v. Newdigate (1804), even though no such 
order had ever been granted before, he felt 
obliged to disguise it as a prohibitory injunction 
by phrasing the orde.r as a double negative. Per-
haps Eldon's judicial philosophy was caused by 
Selden'sjibe of 150 years before. In Gee v. Pritch-
ard (1818), Eldon said, "Nothing would inflict on 
me greater pain ... than the recollection that I 
had done anything to justify the reproach that 
the equity of this court varies like the Chancel-
lor's foot." And thus, by the conclusion of 
Eldon's influential chancellorship, equity had 
become as rigidly bound by precedent as was the 
common law. And indeed ever since, equitable 
remedies have been dispensed with the same un-
derstanding of precedent and stare decisis as 
have common-law remedies. This will vary ac-
cording to the judicial philosophy of a particular 
judge or generation of judges; history shows that 
the pendulum is always in motion. 
EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
By the time of the first English settlements in 
America, equity was an integral part of English 
law. The "Articles, Instructions and Orders" 
551 
dated 20 November 1606 for the government of 
Virginia required that litigation be determined 
"as near to the common laws of England and the 
equity thereof as may be." Once the Virginia 
courts and an educated legal community was es-
tablished, which happened sometime before the 
mid-l 640s, equitable remedies were fully availa-
ble. In Virginia, equity was administered by the 
same courts that heard the common-law cases. In 
some of the New England colonies, equity was 
resisted. ,..fhe probable reason for this was the 
identification of equity and arbitrary royal power 
in the minds of nonlawyers. In eighteenth-cen-
tury New York, an attempt was made to set up a 
court of chancery to administer equity; thi.s was 
strenuously opposed because the governor was 
to be the sole chancellor and this was not politi-
cally desirable. 
The substantive doctrines of equity can be ad-
ministered in separate courts, as in England the 
court of chancery had only equity jurisdiction 
whereas the court of common pleas and the 
court of king's bench had only common-law ju-
risdiction. In 1826 there were separate courts for 
law and equity in Delaware, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, and Mississippi. Today there are sepa-
rate courts in Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, 
and Tennessee. 
' An alternative is the system of fused courts, in 
which common-law and equity cases are adminis-
tered by the same court but common-law cases 
are tried by common-law procedures and equity 
cases by equity procedure. Here the courts are 
said to have a common-law side and an equity 
side. Although the same judge hears both types 
of cases, a case must be brought as either one or 
the other; the court sitting as a common-law 
court cannot grant an equitable remedy, but if 
the case is transferred to the court's equity side, 
it can. The courts of Virginia from 1607 ro the 
present, except for the period 1776-1831', have 
been thus fused. In 1826 the lower courts of New 
York, Maryland, Virginia, Missouri, North Caro-
lina, and Kentucky were examples of this type of 
judicial organization, as were the federal courts 
before 1938. Today this system of justice exists 
in Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia. 
In the 1820s many equitable doctrines were 
being administered in the common-law courts of 
Pennsylvania, and a limited amount of equity had 
slipped into the common-law practice in New 
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England. It was ag-ainst this background thatjo-
seph Story of Massachusetts published his ency-
clopedic treatises on equity practice and equity 
jurisprudence. In the southern states, equity was 
freely available. (It is to be recalled that the first 
reports published in Virginia were a selection of 
equity opinions of George Wythe, which were 
collected for publication in 1795, and the second 
volume of Conway Robinson's The Practice in the 
Courts of Law and Equity in Virginia was published 
in 1835.) On the other hand, in the northern 
states, a general undercurrent of skepticism of 
equity remained. 
In the 1840s a movement for law reform 
through codification was initiated in New York 
by David Dudley Field. His most notable achieve-
ment involved civil procedure, including the ab-
olition of the common-law forms of action and 
the merger of the procedures of common law 
and equity. The most remarkable aspect of the 
New York "Field Code" of 1848 was that the 
substantive doctrines and remedies of common 
law and equity could be freely combined in the 
same lawsuit; this was the first procedural system 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence to provide a 
merged system of law and equity. The substan-
tive rules were not altered, but the old proce-
dures of judicial administration were merged 
into one. It is to be noted that Field's new statu-
tory procedure was a modernized and stream-
lined one based on equity procedure; the com-
mon-law procedures, with the exception of trial 
by jury, were discarded. The success of the 
merger oflaw and equity procedure in New York 
was followed by its successful adoption in most 
states, in England (in 1873), and in federal prac-
tice (in 1938). 
Equity procedures and practices, then, have 
come to dominate American civil procedure 
through the influence of Field. In particular, 
masters and receivers and the equity devices of 
pleading by petition and answer, discovery, in-
terpleader, class actions, third-party practice, in-
junctions, and contempt-of-court proceedings 
have all taken their place in all courts in the 
United States. 
Masters (also known as commissioners) in 
chancery are officers of the court appointed on 
an ad hoc basis to aid the equity judge in per-
forming some routine but time-consuming task. 
The most frequent use of masters is to take com-
plicated accountings and to conduct judicial 
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sales of property. But a master can also be ap-
pointed to hear evidence on some part of the 
case or to draft and execute a conveyance or 
other document. 
Receivers are officers of the court who are 
appointed to take possession of property that is 
the subject of litigation. Such a seizure of prop-
erty may be necessary to prevent its being hid-
den, destroyed, or lost during the course of the 
judicial proceedings. The receiver, at the direc-
tion of the judge, takes possession of the prop-
erty and holds it safely until further order of the 
court. A receiver may be appointed simply to 
hold an object or a fund, or he may even run a 
corporation to preserve it as a going concern, 
pending its sale or reorganization. Receivers are 
appointed to sell off the assets of a bankrupt 
business. 
Equity has also had a deep and lasting impact 
on the content of American law, as well as on its 
procedure. In the area of contracts law, the equi-
table remedy of specific performance is vital. In 
some cases the ancient common-law remedy of 
money damages as.compensation for the wrong-
ful breach of a contract is not adequate to satisfy 
a person; where it is not, a court will exercise its 
equity powers and ·force the defaulting party to 
do what he contracted to do. Thus, where there 
is a contract to sell a unique object, the seller will 
not be allowed to back out and pay damages for 
his breach, but he will be compelled specifically 
to deliver the item sold. Note that the equitable 
remedy is granted only where the common-law 
remedy will not do complete justice; the ancient 
relationships survive in a merged system of ad-
ministration. 
Contracts for the sale of agricultural land will 
be thus "specifically enforced," as the expres-
sion goes. No farm is like any other one, and 
thus, the disappointed buyer cannot go and buy 
another farm to replace his lost bargain, as can 
the purchaser of a ton of gravel. In agricultural 
England, the specific enforcement of land sales 
contracts became so much the normal remedy 
that all land is now considered unique as a matter 
of law and the remedy of specific performance is 
always available, no matter how indistinguisha-
ble one unit of a condominium may be from 
another. 
As to suits to enforce contracts, there are 
many defenses that are of equitable origin, such 
as dishonest conduct that does not involve a di-
',;; 
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rect lie or dilatory conduct that harms another. 
An unforeseeable accident or a catastrophe of 
nature may relieve a person from a contractual 
obligation. A grossly unfair and harsh bargain 
that "shocks the conscience" will be set aside by 
principles of equity, even though the common-
law rules of making the contract were followed. 
Equity has also created a means for assuring 
the adequate supervision of the actions of fiduci-
aries. 'T'hus, the executor of a will may ask an 
equity judge to interpret the will, and the admin-
istrator of a dead person's estate may ask him for 
advice and guidance as to the accounting for, 
and distribution of, the assets. Directors and 
officers of corporations have fiduciary duties to 
their corporations, and therefore, most of the 
problems of corporations and corporation law 
are solved by equitable principles. Trustees and 
guardians are also fiduciaries and are supervised 
by the equity courts. 
The courts of equity also have the power to 
issue orders to forbid the commission of future 
torts where the threatened wrongful act is likely 
to occur in the near future and common-law 
damages will not afford adequate compensation. 
This is known as the court's quia timet jurisdic-
tion; the suit is brought by a person "because he 
fears" that a tort will be committed against him. 
For example, if your -rext door neighbor threat-
ens to cut down an ornamental tree that is on 
your land or to throw poisoned meat onto your 
land so that your dog will eat it, you can get an 
injunction to forbid such acts. Usually the likeli-
hood of imprisonment for contempt of the in-
junction is a sufficient deterrent to the threat-
ened tort. 
Thus, equity has become an integral part of 
American law. The major misconception about 
equity-that it is administered at the whim or 
caprice of the judge-is not, and never has been, 
true. The "discretion" exercised by the equity 
judge is a sound judicial discretion regulated by 
the established principles of equity that have, 
over time, come to play an invaluable role 1n 
American legal practice. 
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